Retribution Requires Rehabilitation by Adams, Joseph Q
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Philosophy Theses Department of Philosophy
4-16-2008
Retribution Requires Rehabilitation
Joseph Q. Adams
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Philosophy at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please
contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Adams, Joseph Q., "Retribution Requires Rehabilitation." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2008.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/35
  
RETRIBUTION REQUIRES REHABILITATION 
by 
JOSEPH Q. ADAMS 
 
Under the Direction of Dr. Andrew J. Cohen and Dr. Christie Hartley 
 
ABSTRACT 
 Herbert Morris argues in his influential retributivist paper, “Persons and Punishment,” 
that criminals deserve punishment because their actions represent an unfair distribution of 
benefits and burdens in society.  The proper distribution of benefits and burdens is important, in 
part, to restore law abiding citizens’ confidence that others will follow the law.  In this paper I 
show that Morris's argument for why criminals deserve punishment morally requires us to set up 
an institution of rehabilitation in addition to the institution of punishment.  Such an institution is 
morally required because neither pure punishment systems nor punishment systems that 
incorporate quasi-rehabilitative aspects have ever worked to uphold the necessary confidence 
that Morris tells us law abiding citizens must have in order to protect the social order.  Moreover, 
we cannot abandon Morris's appeal to the duty to maintain social order without also abandoning 
a plausibly Morrisian framework.   
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Retribution Requires Rehabilitation 
By Joseph Q. Adams 
 In the recent film, “The Brave One,” Jodie Foster’s character is brutalized and her fiancée 
beaten to death with a pipe during a late night walk in Central Park.  She responds to the trauma 
by protecting herself with a gun.  At first she finds herself in various situations where she kills 
career criminals to defend herself and others.  Later she begins “walking the streets at night,” 
ostensibly to diversify her poetic radio show, but, in fact, seeking out such situations.  Finally she 
gets the nerve to hunt down her own attackers.  The theater I was in cheered as she shot her 
attacker in the face.   
 By almost all philosophical accounts, Foster's revenge is not appropriate.1 However, 
many thinkers identify a certain reaction to wrongdoing that, perhaps, underlies the cheers in the 
theater.  The cheers were, at least partly, an indication of satisfaction that Foster's attackers got 
what they deserved.  Philosophers carefully distinguish such satisfaction, what they call the 
retributive emotion, from revenge.2  Revenge is the desire to lower a guilty person.  The 
retributive emotion is the desire to restore proper moral order.  In other words, revenge is 
satisfaction in another person's pain while retribution is satisfaction in justice, properly 
construed.3   
                                                 
1 But see David Hershenov's “Restitution and Revenge.”  Hershenov believes punishment is justified partly because 
it satisfies the victim's desire for revenge.  But even Hershenov stops short of endorsing vigilante revenge—under 
his account the victim still gets revenge through the state.  Another writer endorses a model which rejects the role of 
the state and permits victims to individually exact not revenge, but restitution.  See Randy Barnett's “A New 
Paradigm of Criminal Justice.”  So, even the theories that get us close to justifying Foster's revenge do not in fact do 
so upon close examination. 
2 I adopt Jean Hampton's approach to retributivism for the distinction here.  See pages 137 and 138 of “The 
Retributive Idea” in Forgiveness and Mercy where she clearly distinguishes the two responses. 
3 This explanation of the cheers needs a little more analysis.  Thanks to my 1010 class for challenging me on the 
limited explanation offered above.  For example, if most people were really cheering just because Foster’s attackers 
got what they deserved then presumably they would cheer just as much if, in the end, the police arrived to arrest 
them.  I suspect, however, that such a turn of events would not have elicited the same reaction.  Given this, some 
readers may conclude that revenge is not distinguishable from retribution.  Many philosophers, including the early 
Hampton, considered the distinction dubious.  See Hampton's “Moral Education Theory of Punishment.”  However, 
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 Many thinkers defend the institution of punishment based on the thought that criminals 
get what they deserve through punishment, as opposed to the thought that punishment deters 
criminals.  This paper critiques one such retributivist.  Herbert Morris thinks that criminals 
deserve punishment because their action represents an unfair distribution of benefits and burdens 
in society (Morris, 477-478).  To fail to redistribute benefits and burdens is to fail to respect 
persons, including the criminal, the victim, and society at large.  Moreover, a just system of 
punishment is uniquely equipped to correct this maldistribution (488-490).  In this paper I show 
that Morris's argument for why criminals deserve punishment morally requires us to set up an 
institution of rehabilitation in addition to the institution of punishment.4  Such an institution is 
morally required because neither pure punishment systems nor punishment systems that 
incorporate quasi-rehabilitative aspects have ever worked to uphold the confidence that Morris 
tells us law abiding citizens must have in order to protect the social order.  Moreover, we cannot 
abandon Morris's appeal to the duty to maintain social order without also abandoning a plausibly 
Morrisian framework.  In short, either we must adopt a model that is not strictly punitive in order 
to meet the demand set out by Morris’s theory or else we need to abandon the notion that 
                                                                                                                                                             
there is also a third kind of reaction, a “primitive defensive anger which any of us, as a species of animal, will feel 
toward our attackers” (Hampton and Murphy, 54).  The cheers might have just been a satisfaction in expressing this 
“bite back” response (54).  Further, the cheers could have been satisfaction in the expression of one (or more) of the 
three kinds of hatred outlined by Hampton: malice, spite, or moral hatred.  This story is meant only to introduce 
readers to retribution using an experience with which all could identify: watching a movie.  I note here though that 
an analysis of the class of “retributive emotions,” which would involve a close reading and perhaps critique of 
Hampton's conceptual analysis on the topic, is the subject of future work.  Perhaps experimental philosophy could 
be brought to bear on the subject.   
4 I am using the word “rehabilitation” to refer to a unique way of responding to wrongdoers, a response that is not 
deprivation-based and acts in addition to or perhaps instead of punishment.  I explore the details of in Chapter Five.  
But I need to make clear here that I do not intend the meaning of “rehabilitation” as it is usually employed in the 
punishment literature.  Usually, “rehabilitation” refers to the process of bringing about a change in criminal beliefs 
such that they now avoid crime because they think breaking the law is wrong (Ten, 7, note 1).  But this usage is 
neutral with respect to the form of that process—even severely painful responses can theoretically bring about this 
change.  I do not want to remain neutral with respect to form: rehabilitation, for the purposes of this thesis, should be 
distinguished from traditional modes the state uses to respond to law breaking: imprisonment, fines, execution, and 
the like.  It should connote something like moral education including, as I outline in Chapter Five, subsidized access 
to vital resources upon release, such as housing and transportation. 
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punishment restores the fair distribution of benefits and burdens throughout society.  If we 
abandon that notion, retributivism will need some other basis.5 
 In Chapter One I define punishment and survey both the deontological and 
consequentialist justifications.  As a retributivist, Morris relies on a deontological justification.  
Thus I spend some time characterizing the brand of strong, Kantian retributivism which Morris 
endorses.6  In Chapter Two I present Morris's specific argument.  In Chapter Three I show the 
central advantage of his argument: it morally requires us to punish as a matter of respect.  
Chapter Four highlights the main drawback.  Morris’s characterization of law breakers as 
obtaining an unfair benefit of non-restraint implausibly implies that being restrained from violent 
crime is a rational burden (Murphy and Hampton, 114-117).  After defending Morris against this 
charge, I show, in Chapter Five, why rehabilitation of a certain kind is morally required by 
                                                 
5 This is a surprising outcome in light of the fact that redistribution of benefits and burdens has a powerful appeal to 
Morrisian retributivists who seem largely unconcerned with a non-punitive response to wrongdoers.  This unconcern 
seems deeply flawed to me.  See pages 26 through 29 of R. A. Duff's “Penal Communications: Recent Work in the 
Philosophy of Punishment.”  Duff cites seven philosophers who think “punishment functions to restore that fair 
balance of benefits and burdens that a crime disturbs” (26).  Morris was the first to offer this kind of retributive 
argument.  This surprising outcome might incline some retributivists, like Michael Moore, to deny that any such 
Morrisian arguments are appropriately retributivist.  Retributivism properly understood by Moore appeals strictly to 
the notion that punishment is intrinsically valuable because it is deserved (Moore, 179).  As Jean Hampton says, this 
kind of pure retributivism claims that “it is supposed to bedrock intuition that, at the very least, those who are not 
guilty ought not to suffer pain, and more positively, that those who are guilty deserve to suffer in proportion to the 
pain they have caused” (Murphy and Hampton, 113).  However, this appeal alone does not seem to satisfy.  Many 
readers will want an explanation of desert.  Again, I quote Hampton on this point: “those suspicious of retribution 
are generally unpersuaded by the kind of defense” offered by pure retributivists.  So Morris should be credited with 
defending retribution against the skeptics by offering an explanation of why criminals deserve punishment beyond 
“bedrock intuition.”  Perhaps Moore would respond that, if Morris’s explanation of desert requires us to investigate 
punishment’s ability to restore social order, then we will have to find another explanation.  To fully respond to this 
worry I would need to show that (a) bedrock intuitions are not satisfactory and desert can be explicated, but that (b) 
any explication will require us to setup rehabilitation.  If my argument in this thesis is cogent I will have shown why 
one highly-favored explication of desert requires rehabilitation.   
6 Even though punishment under Morris’s framework must protect the social order in the sense that it must restore 
law abiding citizens’ confidence that others will continue to follow the law (through proper distribution of benefits 
and burdens), it is appropriate to classify Morris as a Kantian retributivist.  The restoration of confidence is 
important insofar as it helps ensure proper respect for all participants through the fair distribution of benefits and 
burdens.  Punishment is still a matter of respect—respecting the rights of law abiding citizens to be confident in the 
ability of our institutions to insure that state responses to criminal wrongdoing justly redistribute benefits and 
burdens.  Thanks to Professor Christie Hartley for clarifying this for me. 
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Morris's argument.  Finally, in Chapter Six I respond to the central objection that rehabilitation, 
like punishment, cannot meet the moral demands of Morris’s theory.      
 
Chapter One: The Ethical Background 
 Philosophically, the most interesting part of punishment is its justification.  Because it 
involves harm, punishment needs justification.  Hugo Adam Bedau summarizes the reasons that 
punishment needs justification: 
Since punishment involves intentionally inflicting deprivations on persons by 
someone with authority to do so, and since the deprivations themselves are 
typically not unlike the harms that crimes cause (fines are like theft, imprisonment 
like kidnapping, etc.), punishment has generally been thought to need justification 
(Bedau, 732). 
 
We justify punishment by giving good reasons to believe that punishment is, under a certain set 
of conditions, either morally permissible or morally required.  This chapter surveys some of the 
traditional reasons philosophers offer for the claim that punishment is sometimes an appropriate 
response.  I focus on strong Kantian retributivism, which is the view that punishment is 
sometimes morally required.   
Before we can examine different justifications for punishment, however, we need to get 
clear about what, exactly, we are justifying.  We need a working definition of punishment.  I 
adopt H. L. A. Hart’s definition of punishment (Hart, 4-5).  For my purposes, punishment will be 
understood as the deliberate state-sanctioned infliction of harm distributed by officials to law 
breakers who have been found guilty.  The definition has five parts.  First, punishment involves 
some sort of deprivation or loss, especially the removal of certain rights.  Second, punishment is 
a response to someone who broke a law.  Third, it is administered to people who have been 
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found guilty of breaking the law.7  Fourth, it is a human institution.  Finally, it is an action 
sanctioned by the state.   
There are two kinds of ethical theories that we generally use when worried about the 
justification of an institution like punishment:  consequentialism and deontology.  We may think 
of ethics as that field of philosophy concerned with proper human action.  Narrowed in this 
regard, ethics is the study of which human actions we should undertake in various sorts of 
situations.8  Consequentialism and deontology provide two different frameworks from which to 
evaluate the rightness and wrongness of human action.  These theories provide two different 
families of reasons to believe that a certain action is right or wrong.  While most comprehensive 
theories of punishment incorporate elements of both kinds of reasons,9 I explain each ethical 
theory separately.   
Consequentialism and Deontology 
I begin with consequentialism.  Consequentialists rely on an important distinction 
between the right and the good.  For consequentialists, goodness can be evaluated from an agent-
neutral perspective (Darwall, Consequentialism, 2).10  To understand agent-neutrality, imagine a 
planet like Earth in every respect except that it lacks humans.  Sunsets, according to this ethical 
theory, could still be good.  They are harmonious states of affairs even though no humans enjoy 
                                                 
7 There is a distinction between “being guilty” and “being found guilty.”  The definition uses “being found guilty” in 
order to avoid begging the question against consequentialist theories.  Because consequentialists can hold that we 
can acceptably punish innocent people (who would still be found guilty by the judiciary), we do not want to beg the 
question by limiting punishment to that class which is actually guilty. 
8 David Brink observes that ethical theories can apply to “virtually any object of moral assessment, including 
actions, motives, individual lives, institutions, and moral codes” (Brink, 381).  This thesis focuses on the moral 
assessment of the legal institution of punishment.  However, at this point, it is easier to approach the ethical theories 
as a whole from the perspective of individual action.  There are complications when we apply a theory of action to 
institutions but the principles outlined herein should remain the same. 
9 H. L. A Hart, for example, is known for promoting dual theories.  See the first chapter of his Punishment and 
Responsibility.   Bedau characterizes the hybrid theory as the consensus among philosophers.  See his entry 
“Punishment” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  By the end of this thesis we see why a traditionally 
consequentialist problem has the potential to undermine Morris's fundamentally deontological theory.   
10 I rely on Stephen Darwall’s introduction to his book Consequentialism for my discussion in this paragraph. 
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them.  Consequentialists believe that the right action (the ethical action) is that action which—on 
balance—brings about the most (real world) goodness, whether agent-neutral or agent-relative, 
as evaluated from an agent-neutral perspective.  The point is that “there are values that are prior 
to morality,” or prior to rightness (1).  For consequentialists, rightness is a matter of promoting 
goodness.   
One noteworthy feature of consequentialism understood in this broad way is that it 
remains neutral with respect to the nature of a given action (Brink, 381).  Whatever action 
produces the most good is the right action.  Actions are not in themselves intrinsically right or 
wrong.  As a result, consequentialism has the theoretical ability to endorse actions that strike us 
as, at the very least, strange.  In the case of punishment, consequentialists can, at least in theory, 
recommend that we should punish innocent people.11  If, among the various alternatives, 
punishing an innocent person causes the most good, then punishing an innocent person is the 
right thing to do.  The fact that punishing innocent people strikes many of us as morally wrong is 
one of the central objections to a pure consequentialist justification of punishment.  
While they remain neutral with respect to the nature of an action which promotes the 
good, consequentialists disagree about “what constitutes the relevant consequences of an act” 
(Ten, 3).  One consequentialist may call an action right where another calls it wrong (or remains 
indifferent) because the action causes a state of affairs the first considers good and the second 
does not.   
A popular form of consequentialism is utilitarianism.  According to some utilitarians, the 
right action is the one that, among the various alternatives, results in the highest level of total 
utility.  Utilitarians divide themselves according to their understanding of utility.  Call one who 
                                                 
11 See C. L. Ten's excellent discussion of the issue of punishing the innocent in “Fantastic Examples and Moral 
Principles” on pages 18-36 in Chapter 2 of his Crime, Guilt, and Punishment. 
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defines utility in terms of happiness, where happiness is the presence of pleasure and the absence 
of pain, a classical utilitarian.12  The right action is the one which maximizes pleasure over pain.  
One could also define utility in terms of preference satisfaction.  In this case the right action is 
the one which satisfies as much and as many preferences as possible.  There are other ways to 
define utility as well, but for the purposes of this chapter, I review the consequentialist 
justification of punishment from the perspective of the classical utilitarian.   
Unlike the classical utilitarian and other consequentialists, deontologists deny that moral 
evaluations can be made from an agent-neutral perspective (Darwall, Deontology, 1).  We cannot 
determine the right action from an agent-neutral perspective by reference to the agent-relative or 
agent-neutral goods that result.  For deontologists some actions are morally required or 
prohibited–a right or wrong action to perform–regardless of whether they bring about good states 
of affairs.  Some deontologists believe certain constraints on behavior are absolute—never to be 
overridden—while others believe these constraints can be overridden by, for example, duties of 
special care (McNaughton and Rawling, 425).  Both of these camps agree, however, that at least 
some constraints cannot be overridden by the value of promoting the good.  According to 
Darwall, we discover these constraints by reflecting on the nature of the action itself (Darwall, 
Deontology, 4-5).  
Darwall uses the simple example of betrayal to explain deontology.  “The moral duty not 
to betray one’s friends, deontologists claim, is agent-relative [and is] irreducible to any agent-
neutral values” (2).  I should not betray my friend even if my betrayal causes many good 
consequences.  Betrayal is just a bad thing to do.   
                                                 
12 This is the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham.  “By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to 
produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or 
(what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party 
whose interest is considered” (Bentham, 12).  While there are other classical utilitarians who have a different 
definition of happiness, Bentham's version suits my purposes.  
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The Consequentialist Justification of Punishment 
 Consequentialists usually justify punishment because it promotes the good by reducing 
crime (Ten, 7-8).  Understood from the classical utilitarian perspective, reducing crime is good 
because crime is inversely correlated with the general happiness.  All else being equal, rational 
people tend to experience more happiness when there is less crime.   
Utilitarians identify two general ways punishment theoretically reduces crime: 
incapacitation and deterrence.  Punishment straightforwardly reduces crimes committed by 
individuals through physically constraining or killing those individuals.  The state ensures that, at 
least during the time of incapacitation (which is indefinite in the case of execution), the criminal 
herself cannot commit crime among the general population.13 
Deterrence is a negative incentive (Blumstein, 19).  A positive incentive increases the 
benefits of a behavior in order to encourage that behavior.  A negative incentive increases the 
cost of a behavior in order to discourage that behavior.  Punishment raises the cost of a behavior 
in terms of time, money, freedom, and humiliation in order to discourage law breaking.   
Theoretically, punishment deters both the individual criminal and the general public.  
With “special deterrence,” punishment discourages repeat individual criminal behavior (Nagin, 
95).  In this case, the punishment of a criminal reduces the chance that the same criminal will 
commit another crime.  Punishment motivates criminals to stop breaking the law for two types of 
                                                 
13 Of course, the criminal can still commit a crime in jail or prison.  Depending on your view of criminal-on-criminal 
crime and (if you consider it legitimate crime) the volume of it, incapacitation will work more or less to reduce 
overall crime.  I should note that the sometimes-cited “criminogenic effect” has been refuted by the empirical data 
(see the report of the panel cited in note 14 below).  The criminogenic effect is the theoretical idea that criminals 
increase their crime skills while incapacitated with other, more experienced criminals.  Prison thus increases the 
amount of crime committed by released criminals by making them more “hardened.”  If the criminogenic effect 
actually takes hold, utilitarians would have to factor it in when justifying punishment (it might offset benefits 
obtained through incapacitation and deterrence).  However, the evidence suggests that neither criminogenic nor 
special deterrent effects hold. 
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reasons.  They may be convinced that breaking the law is wrong,14 or they may just be afraid of 
more punishment.  Regardless of the motivating reasons behind a criminal’s change of behavior 
we can say that the criminal is deterred in the sense that state has produced a stoppage in her 
criminal behavior. 
With “general deterrence,” punishment discourages criminal behavior in the general 
public.  As Daniel Nagin puts it, “the imposition of sanctions on one person may demonstrate to 
the rest of the public the expected costs of a criminal act, and thereby discourage criminal 
behavior in the general population” (96).  In this case, the punishment of a criminal reduces the 
chance that a potential future criminal will commit crime. 15     
I will not go into them here, but I should note that there are other ways, besides crime 
reduction, that punishment might promote the good.  Punishment may satisfy the desire for 
revenge.  If we are Machiavellian, punishment may appropriately cause fear in the population.  
Punishment may produce religious converts (at least seeming-converts). Any of these reasons to 
endorse punishment would be consequentialist, although, arguably, none of them would be part 
of good arguments.16   
 
 
                                                 
14 The literature includes these types of criminals—the ones who stop for moral reasons as a result of punitive 
responses—as a part of the class of “rehabilitated” criminals.  But this is not how I use the term rehabilitation so I 
just incorporate this set of criminals into the deterred set. 
15 Some notes on the effectiveness of these theoretical benefits.  According to the “Report of the Panel,” an 
extensive study commissioned by the government and conducted by academics during the 1970's, special deterrence 
is ineffective.  General deterrence appears somewhat effective.  Incapacitation appears somewhat effective.  
Deterrence resulting from hybrid punitive and non-punitive methods also appears ineffective.  Ten, who compares 
the “Report of the Panel” with other studies basically sides with the report when he says that “We see that the 
evidence is perhaps more hospitable to the claim that punishment has some general deterrent effect and some 
incapacitative effect than it is to the claim that it has individual deterrent effect or that it rehabilitates offenders” 
(Ten, 12).  One thing we can conclude from this evidence is that punishment works better as a symbolic mechanism 
than as an experienced reality.  Can we find ways to create the symbolism without actually harming people?  And 
would that be a morally better situation?  These are questions for future research. 
16 Except perhaps Hershenov's argument from revenge.  See note 1 above.  However, Hershenov's argument is 
comprehensive so it involves both consequentialist and deontological justifications.   
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The Deontological Justification of Punishment 
 I now turn to the deontological justification of punishment.  Deontologists are associated 
with the retributive justification of punishment.  I present the retributive justification of 
punishment as traditionally found in the literature, with a focus on strong retributivism.  Then I 
explicitly draw the connection between retributivism and deontology.   
Retributivists usually argue that punishment is justified because it is deserved.  Michael 
S. Moore characterizes retributivism generally as follows: 
We are justified in punishing because and only because offenders deserve it.  
Moral culpability (“desert”) is in such a view both a sufficient as well as 
necessary condition of liability to punitive sanctions.  For a retributivist, the moral 
culpability of an offender also gives society the duty to punish.  Retributivism, in 
other words, is truly a theory of justice such that, if it is true, we have an 
obligation to set up institutions so that retribution is achieved (Moore, 179). 
 
Call this form of retributivism the “strong form.”  Under strong retributivism we must punish 
criminals.  By contrast, weak retributivism, which I will not deal with, merely requires that we 
have the right to punish.  Under strong retributivism, the criminal's past action creates a demand 
that society is obligated to meet.  Fundamental to retributivism is the idea of “moral culpability” 
or desert.  Someone deserves something when that person's past action places an obligation for 
further action on the part of some other party.  For example, under normal conditions, my 
winning a professional tennis tournament places an obligation on the tournament committee to 
award me a trophy and prize money.  In this case, the desert is either explicitly outlined by the 
tournament committee prior to the tournament or implicitly demanded by social convention.  On 
account of my winning, I deserve a trophy and prize money.  Similarly, with punishment, my 
committing a crime places an obligation on the state to punish me.  Like the tennis tournament, 
the state's obligation is laid out beforehand in the law.  On account of my crime, I deserve 
punishment.   
11 
 Strong retributivism, as understood by Moore, can be defended in a variety of ways.  
Authors differ in their account of criminal desert.  I focus here on strong Kantian retributivism 
whereby criminals deserve punishment because we must respect their choices as moral agents.17  
Other arguments include intuitionism,18 arguments from social cohesion,19 and annulment 
theories.20   
 Whatever version of retributivism we adopt, we need an understanding of desert or moral 
culpability.  Contained in the idea of desert is the idea that criminals choose to commit a crime.  I 
                                                 
17 The brand of Kantian retributivism we have in mind here should be distinguished from Kant's retributivism.  
Deontological justifications that appeal to the equal inherent worth of all as a reason to believe that criminals 
deserve punishment may be called “Kantian,” without adhering to Kant's own theory of punishment.  Kant's own 
theory of punishment has drawbacks which I cannot cover in detail.  Moreover we should distinguish both of these 
from interpretations of Kant’s retributivism.  One such interpretation involves Kant’s advocacy of strict 
proportionality between crime and punishment, the doctrine of lex talionis.  Lex talionis demands that criminals 
suffer a form of punishment which exactly matches the harm inflicted by the criminal.  “But what is the mode and 
measure of Punishment which Public Justice takes as its Principle and Standard?  It is just the Principle of Equality 
[which] may be rendered by saying that the undeserved evil which any one commits on another, is to be regarded as 
perpetrated on himself.  Hence it may be said: 'If you slander another, you slander yourself; if you steal from another 
you steal from yourself; if you strike another you strike yourself; if you kill another, you kill yourself'” (Kant, 196).  
Jean Hampton points out that one way to interpret this doctrine is to demand, for example, that if a criminal throws 
acid on a victim's face, the criminal should have acid thrown on his face (Murphy and Hampton, 136).  Hampton 
believes, and I agree with her, however, that a “sophisticated retributivist” will deny strict proportionality while 
maintaining the Kantian doctrine that no human being, including a criminal, should receive inhumane treatment 
(136).  Kant himself backs off the claim of strict proportionality.  While he says that “there is no Equality between 
the crime of Murder and the retaliation of it but what is judicially accomplished by the execution of the Criminal,” 
which seems to imply that an exact match is needed, he qualifies this statement saying, “his death, however, must be 
kept free from all maltreatment that would make the humanity suffering in his Person loathsome or abominable” 
(Kant, 198).  In other words, we cannot endorse a Kantian theory which allows the state to treat persons in ways 
which violate their personhood.  “A good retributivist generally wants limits placed on punishment sentences” 
(Murphy and Hampton, 135).  How, then, does a sophisticated retributivist still give the criminal what he deserves?  
“There are methods of [punishment] that may be severe if the criminal has gravely mistreated his victim, but which 
are nonetheless not so harsh that they are identical either to the treatments which are considered permissible only for 
entities far less valuable than human beings or to treatments which actually make them less valuable” (136).  In 
other words, we can insure proportionality (which is demanded by a Kantian retributivism) without committing 
ourselves to strict proportionality.  A commitment to strict proportionality can only by called “Kantian” by 
inspiration.   
18 See J. L. Mackie's “Morality and the Retributive Emotions.” 
19 Emily Durkheim and Patrick Devlin, for example, believe that criminals must be punished because they have 
threatened society's moral fabric, a fabric upon which law and order vitally depend.  Morris's theory is partly of this 
type.  See brief summaries of Durkheim and Devlin in Chapter Two of Kadish and Schulhofer’s Criminal Law and 
its Processes.  
20 See Chapter Four of Forgiveness and Mercy where Hampton argues that punishment is deserved because it annuls 
the crime's status as evidence that the criminal has more worth than the victim.  See also Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right, Sections 95 to 103.  He says that punishment cancels or negates the crime itself, where the crime itself is a 
null negation of the victim’s right (Hegel, 123).  Hampton takes herself to be clarifying Hegel, but the differences 
between the two are worth exploring in future projects.  I believe this kind of basis for retributivism, while still 
flawed, is the most promising retributive argument. 
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only deserve something if the action which is thought to give rise to that desert is done 
voluntarily.21*  Desert does not arise if the action is non-voluntary.  A mother does not punish a 
child who strikes another while having a seizure because the child with the seizure does not 
choose to cause harm.22  Hence the child does not deserve punishment.        
 Kantian retributivists believe we must punish criminals because we must respect their 
choices as moral agents.  We start with the idea that a criminal's action is morally culpable and 
sufficiently bad so as to merit punishment by the state (as opposed to mere disapproval by 
others).  This culpability creates an obligation on the part of the state to punish—we say the 
criminal deserves punishment.  The source of this culpability is the criminal's voluntary choice—
she chooses to commit a crime.  As Kantians, we must respect the choice of the criminal because 
all human beings have the same moral worth and it is their ability to choose which differentiates 
them from, for example, animals and inanimate objects (Morris, 490).23   As Morris says, “When 
we 'look upon' a person as less than a person or not a person, we consider the person as incapable 
of rational choice” (490).  This is the Kantian idea: all rational beings, in virtue of their 
                                                 
21 * A special note on intentionality.  I have chosen to define a culpable action as one which is done “voluntarily” or 
“by choice.”  I want to stay neutral with respect to what constitutes “intentional.” I assume that whatever (you think) 
intentionality is, it is required for culpability.  So the only people to whom this discussion might be untenable are 
those who think intentionality does not exist.  But perhaps even those readers will allow that voluntary actions exist.   
     In legal terminology an individual must have the appropriate mens rea (in addition to the actus rea) in order to be 
punishable.  One must be in the appropriate frame of mind (mens rea) in addition to actually doing the crime (actus 
rea).  By defining culpability as I have done I subscribe to what Kadish and Schulhofer call the “general” or “all-
encompassing” sense of mens rea.  According to them, “one way the requirement of mens rea may be rationalized is 
on the common sense view of justice that blame and punishment are inappropriate and unjust in the absence of 
choice” (Kadish and Schulhofer, 203).  They endorse, however, the “special” sense of mens rea where “mens rea 
refers only to the mental state required by the definition of the offense to accompany the act” (203). 
22 I do not mean to take a position with respect to the debate about metaphysical freedom.  By “voluntary” action I 
do not mean to imply a commitment to any position in that debate.  It is a placeholder for the conditions for moral 
responsibility.  My purpose here is just to acknowledge that the debate on metaphysical freedom itself and its 
intersection with moral responsibility is wide open.  While I find it fascinating and think it vital for metaphysicians 
to more freely dialogue with moral theorists, I do not have time to engage this debate here.  
23 Human worth should be distinguished from human value.  The worth of a human being is that which determines 
the level of respect due in virtue of personhood, defined by Kant in terms of a human's capacity to reason.  The 
value of a human being is that which determines the level of respect due in virtue of some other characteristic, for 
example, one’s painting skill.  A Kantian must hold that all persons have equal worth but is not committed to the 
idea that all persons have equal value.  I can be better than you at tennis, but I cannot be better than you as a person. 
A non-Kantian, on the other hand, might believe that persons can have various levels of worth.   
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personhood or rationality, have equal moral worth.  To treat them as not responsible for their 
rational choices is to treat them as non-persons.  There is an absolute deontological constraint on 
our actions: we can never treat persons in such a way that disrespects their rationality.  To not 
punish the criminal is to fail to respect the criminal as a rational chooser.  Respecting rational 
beings requires respecting their autonomy.  This means holding them responsible for actions in 
which they voluntarily engage.  Thus, under strong Kantian retributivism we must punish the 
criminal because to do otherwise disrespects the personhood of the criminal (violates the 
absolute constraint) by failing to respect the criminal's choice.   
 
Chapter Two: Morris’s Retributivism 
 In this chapter I focus on Herbert Morris's retributivist justification for punishment.  
Morris's argument is a brand of Kantian retributivism.  I present Morris's argument in this 
chapter.  In Chapter Three I show its main advantage, while Chapter Four covers the central 
disadvantage. 
Here is Morris's argument in a one-liner: criminals must be punished because criminals 
must “pay” for their free ride in a mutually advantageous, cooperative system of self-restraint 
(Morris, 477).  Social order is maintained by rules which restrict persons from engaging in a 
certain set of actions.  These restrictions are just because they “provide advantages for all” (492).  
People who break the law get the benefit of not restraining themselves and thus violate the 
mutual advantage.  They cheat.  It is unfair for criminals to receive this benefit when others have 
properly restrained themselves.  Thus, criminals must be burdened with punishment in order to 
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re-balance the distribution.  Morris seems to think a system of just punishment is the only way to 
restore the balance of benefits and burdens without disrespect (488-490).24  
 Morris starts with a certain idea about the nature of society and law.  The law defines a 
sphere of non-interference for individuals.  In exchange for assuming the burden of following the 
law, individuals receive the benefit of non-interference by others.  Society is, thus, mutually 
advantageous.25  We limit our own freedom in exchange for a certain level of security.   
Applying to the conduct of [people] are...rules that prohibit violence and 
deception and compliance with which provides benefits for all persons.  These 
benefits consist in noninterference by others with what each person values, such 
matters as a continuance of life and bodily security.  The rules define a sphere for 
each person, then, which is immune from interference by others.  Making possible 
this mutual benefit is the assumption by individuals of a burden.  The burden 
consists in the exercise of self-restraint by individuals over inclinations that 
would, if satisfied, directly interfere or create substantial risk of interference with 
others in proscribed ways (477). 
 
The first thing to see here is that Morris presents the purpose of law.  Laws, or rules, exist 
essentially to protect individuals from “violence and deception.”  We burden ourselves by 
restraining from certain actions (we follow the law) and receive, in exchange, the benefit of “life 
and bodily security” resulting from a corresponding restraint on the part of our fellow citizens. 
Such a system of cooperation or “mutual benefit” can be maintained only if individuals take on a 
                                                 
24 There are, however, a variety of ways in which we might restore the balance.  Morris entertains therapy which he 
rejects outright (480-488), forgiveness (i.e. pardoning) which he endorses only if used rarely (478,488), shaming 
systems which he rejects after brief discussion (488), and of course punishment which he endorses (477-480).  I find 
his discussion curious because he never mentions rehabilitation, a fifth option.  In Chapter Five I show why Morris's 
commitment to balancing out benefits and burdens requires him to endorse rehabilitation.  One way to reconcile this 
curiosity is to read Morris as assuming that his system of just punishment incorporates rehabilitation (he never 
fleshes out the details of the form of punishment).  I think it is pretty clear, however, that like most retributivists he 
conceives of his system of just punishment as mainly deprivation-based, concerned only with harming, rather than 
rehabilitating, offenders: “the deprivations visited upon any person are justified by that person's having violated the 
rules” (480).  See Chapter Five for a full discussion of these points.     
25 I do not mean to suggest that society is contractarian or contractualist.  We may still have a duty to obey the law in 
light merely of reciprocity and this seems the best way to read Morris.  So while laws are “mutually advantageous” 
they are not, on Morris's account, necessarily “agreed to” in the sense that social contract theorists assert.  I am 
friendly to social contract theory but I wish to remain agnostic about it here since Morris himself seems to be 
agnostic.  In short both social contract theorists and their opponents may endorse Morris's justification of 
punishment, albeit for different reasons.   
15 
burden of self-restraint.  Law abiding citizens take on the burden of not committing crime.  They 
pay the cost of denying themselves a certain set of behaviors.  The benefit is that law abiding 
citizens are assured that others also restrain themselves in a similar way.  Thus citizens maintain 
the health of society by sharing equally the burdens of self-restraint and the benefits of non-
interference.  When we break the law we create an imbalance by throwing off our burden of self-
restraint.   
 The most straightforward examples of Morris's cooperative system of self-restraint come 
from property laws.26  Suppose that my farmland is situated such that it would be significantly 
more convenient for you to drive across my land to reach your golf course.  But your farmland is 
situated such that it would be significantly more convenient for me to drive across your land to 
reach my yoga class.  Neither of us want our crops to suffer car damage, even though both of us 
would prefer (and have no qualms about) driving across the other's land.  We pass a law against 
trespassing.  In exchange for the burden of restraining myself from driving across your land I 
receive the benefit of your not driving across my land.  Both of our crops prosper and we each 
find the arrangement advantageous.    
 Criminals are people who throw off their burden of self-restraint.  Suppose I am in a big 
rush one morning.  I am late for my yoga class, and we are learning an important new move.  I 
decide to break the mutually advantageous trespassing law and drive across your farmland.  In 
this case I throw off my burden of self-restraint.  I break the law.  
 We must punish people who break the law for two reasons.  First, we must safeguard the 
confidence law abiding citizens have that others will continue to restrain themselves (477-478).  
                                                 
26 Hampton points out that Morris's argument works best with property crimes in her critique of Morris on pages 
114-117 of Forgiveness and Mercy. 
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Second, if we focus just on the maldistribution between the victim and the criminal, the 
maldistribution just demands to be rebalanced because it is unequal (478).   
 The farmland example readily shows the first reason.  When you inspect your crops the 
next day and notice my tire marks, you have two possible responses.  You may continue to 
follow the law, hoping that my actions are a one-time offense.  In this case I have the benefit of 
your self-restraint without the burden of my self-restraint.  On the other hand, you may decide to 
throw off your own burden of self-restraint.  As Morris puts it, law abiding citizens' “disposition 
to comply voluntarily will diminish as they learn that others are with impunity renouncing 
burdens they are assuming” (477).  My breaking the law reduces your confidence in my ability to 
comply and thus tempts you to break the law yourself.  Before long, we destroy each others' 
crops.  Punishment is thus partly justified as a “mechanism designed to prevent a 
maldistribution” which would otherwise undermine the social order (477).  Sanctions work to 
“induce compliance with [the law] among those who may be disinclined to obey” (477-478).  In 
short, the deterrence of criminals through punishment works to uphold the social order by 
insuring equal distribution of benefits and burdens. 
 The unequal distribution of benefits and burdens also appears to require punishment 
purely on grounds of fairness.  Even if your tendency to obey the law voluntarily is not 
diminished by my trespassing on your farmland, punishment is still required.  By breaking the 
law, the criminal obtains the benefit of not restraining herself.  Punishment is an act of the state 
which burdens criminals by depriving them of important goods.  Punishment is thus seen as a 
way of balancing the scales.27  With punishment the criminal receives a burden which counters 
the benefit of non-restraint.  “Matters are not even,” Morris tells us, until the criminal's unequal 
benefit is counter balanced through the burden of punishment (478).  In our farmland case, my 
                                                 
27 Thanks to Professor Andrew J. Cohen for putting it this way. 
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driving across your farmland will trigger a punishment (a burden) that counter balances the   
benefit I gained from not restraining myself in order to get to yoga class on time. 
 
Chapter Three: The Advantages of Morris's Argument 
 In this chapter I highlight the central advantage of Morris's theory.  I show why Morris's 
theory is consistent with an egalitarian theory of human worth.  Such a commitment in Morris's 
case not only makes punishment morally permissible, but, like Kant's legal philosophy, makes 
punishment morally required. 
 What was a controversial claim in Morris's day has become the central advantage of his 
theory: the idea that punishment actually respects the criminal.  “There is a tradition...not notable 
for its present vitality... [whose] adherents have urged that justice requires a person to be 
punished if he is guilty.  Sometimes—though rarely—these philosophers have expressed 
themselves in terms of the criminal's right to be punished” (475-476).  Here Morris clearly 
places himself in the strong retributivist camp.  We see that “justice requires” punishment 
because we have a duty to respect the rights of others—in the criminal's case, we have a duty to 
respect her right to be punished.28  So a Kantian theory of human worth appears to be at the heart 
of Morris's argument: respecting people as persons entails punishing them (assuming they are 
guilty).      
Why is Morris's commitment to a Kantian theory of human worth advantageous?  Most 
importantly, such a commitment gives us a strong justification for the institution of punishment.  
                                                 
28  Depending on our view of the nature of rights, characterizing punishment as a right of the criminal’s may imply 
that this right can be waived.  Thanks to Professor William A. Edmundson for pointing this difficulty out to me.  I 
cannot get into the debates about the nature of rights here.  However, I think it is clear that Morris means that this 
right cannot be waived.  So, it may have just been better for Morris to leave out talk of the criminal’s right to be 
punished.  His thought that the criminal has a right to be punished is clearly intended to support the idea that justice 
requires us to punish culpable criminal wrongdoing, no matter what (except for the rare use of pardon). 
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If punishment respects the criminal, then we have a powerful reason to consider it morally 
appropriate.  We can “rest easy” in the confidence that we have given good reasons to do things 
to criminals that the law would otherwise forbid: take their money and forcibly confine them, for 
example.   
Such a commitment also comes with certain safeguards that we find morally appealing.  
These include prohibitions against punishing innocent people and the ability for lawbreakers to 
defend themselves.  These safeguards flow naturally out of a justice system that protects reason 
and autonomy.  I address each of these safeguards in turn.   
 If punishment respects criminals, it must distinguish guilty lawbreakers from non-guilty 
lawbreakers.  I cannot debate here the various ways in which a justice system might go about 
doing this.  I just note that, respecting criminals means we must find some way to distinguish the 
guilty from the non-guilty.  Furthermore, most philosophers tend to agree that a proper justice 
system allows for excuse, justification, and mitigation.  Morris's theory demands such 
safeguards.  “A person has not derived an unfair advantage if he could not have restrained 
himself or if it is unreasonable to expect him to behave otherwise than he did” (478).  So 
Morris's theory has the advantage of requiring these proper safeguards, but I leave it an open 
question as to how to ground excuse, justification, and mitigation.   
 Besides prohibiting the punishment of innocent persons, Morris's system also endorses 
the attractive principle of innocent until proven guilty.29  Punishment of the truly guilty respects 
                                                 
29 This is a further advantage that should be distinguished from, although it arises out of, the prohibition on 
punishing the innocent.  In theory, one could prohibit punishing the innocent and consider individuals guilty until 
proven innocent, or just “neutral” until proven guilty, or even neutral until proven innocent.  Because the practice of 
determining guilt or innocence combines the many imperfections of human beings (bad memory, poor cognition, 
over- and under-zealous prosecution and defense, just to name a few) and the blunt instrument of the state 
(ambiguous and unclear laws, limited police and judicial resources, etc.) a theory that recognizes these limitations 
has a distinct advantage.  Because these epistemic limitations as to the truth of guilt exist, we should endorse an 
innocent until proven guilty standard as long as we consider the moral cost of punishing innocents greater than the 
moral cost of freeing guilty persons. 
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all parties involved (victim, society, criminal) while punishment of the innocent respects none of 
these.  Morris recognizes that in the pursuit of giving criminals what they deserve we might 
accidentally punish an innocent (479).  Such a situation is unjust under Morris's theory because 
innocent people have not gained an unfair benefit.  As such, Morris endorses a theory which 
emphasizes that citizens are innocent until proven guilty.  Such an emphasis is proper given that 
the point of law in the first place is to provide a certain protected sphere of non-interference 
(479).  Punishment of the innocent would pierce this sphere.  Of course it is still possible, even 
under the principle of innocent until proven guilty, that we may pierce the sphere by punishing 
the innocent but falsely proven guilty.  Whenever we punish the innocent, we transgress the very 
principle which gives rise to law in the first place.  An innocent until proven guilty principle is 
thus the lesser of a variety of evils, and to that extent, a virtue.  The other options (guilty until 
proven innocent) make such transgressions more likely. 
 In a punishment system that treats persons as ends in themselves, lawbreakers are also 
given the space to defend themselves.  Criminals are entitled to hold on a variety of beliefs about 
both their behavior and the law which they broke.  They can maintain their innocence both 
before and after being found guilty.  Alternatively, they may admit to their deed, but maintain 
that it is not blameworthy or should not be illegal.  Criminals are free to express their opinions 
about the law which they broke, which makes room for civil disobedience.  All of this is in line 
with a commitment to free speech, an important principle in a liberal democracy.   
 I should note here that to remain consistent Morris will have to admit that non-criminals, 
as well, are free to express their opinions as to the criminal's behavior and the law which they 
broke.  Obviously, Morris must permit individuals to advocate for or against the lawbreakers and 
for or against the morality of the law which they broke.  I focus, in Chapter Five, on the further 
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question of what the state may or must do, in addition to punishment, to rehabilitate the criminal.  
Let me briefly anticipate the discussion here.  The relatively uncontroversial (but still helpful) 
point is that nothing in Morris's theory prohibits us from setting up an additional institution 
parallel to the institution of punishment that seeks to change criminals through reasoned and 
respectful argumentation.  The more interesting point is that, on Morris's justification, we must 
set up such an institution.  So it seems strange that he omits a discussion of rehabilitation, 
especially in light of the fact that he acknowledges other alternatives to punishment and 
therapy.30 
 I structure the rest of this paper as follows.  In Chapter Four I present Jean Hampton's 
critique of Morris's argument which shows the main disadvantage of his theory: he seems to say 
that people find abstaining from violent crimes to be a rational burden.  I respond to Hampton's 
critique on behalf of Morris before exposing, in Chapter Five, my own critique.  Accepting 
Morris's characterization of criminals as throwing off a burden (contra Hampton) requires us to 
implement an institution which tries to rehabilitate the criminal.  I think it is important to see that 
retribution on Morris's terms demands that we rehabilitate criminals, at least in addition to (but 
perhaps instead of), harming them.   
 
Chapter Four: Hampton's Critique and a Response 
 It will be useful at this point to standardize Morris's argument in order to see clearly how 
Hampton's critique differs from my own.  Morris's argument is actually composed of two 
arguments.  The first establishes that criminals obtain a benefit of non-restraint (this argument is 
contested by Hampton).  The second establishes that punishment removes (or balances) this 
benefit (and is thus justified).  My contention is that the evidence developed by Morris's 
                                                 
30 See note 24 above. 
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Argument 2 requires us to set up an institution of rehabilitation—that premise 5 must include 
rehabilitation as well as punishment.  We can standardize the arguments as follows: 
Argument 1 
1. Society sets out mutually advantageous rules (laws) which prohibit persons from 
engaging in certain acts (defining a “sphere” of non-interference). 
2. Criminals are people who (culpably) break the law; they are people who pierce the sphere 
of non-interference. 
Therefore, 
3. Criminals get an unfair benefit: they throw off their own burden of self-restraint while 
enjoying others' restraint.  
Argument 2 
      3.   Criminals get an unfair benefit. 
4. We must remove31 the criminal's benefit because he takes advantage of law abiders. 
5. Punishment removes the benefit that criminals get from lawbreaking by forcing them to 
incur an additional burden.   
Therefore,  
6. We must punish the criminal.  
 The characterization of the unfair benefit of non-restraint under Argument 1 has been 
criticized by Hampton and others (Murphy and Hampton, 114-117).32  While it is plausible to 
say that rational people are burdened by restraining themselves from property crimes, it is not 
plausible to assume that rational people are burdened by restraining themselves from violent 
                                                 
31 “Remove” is a little misleading.  Morris does not suggest that punishment makes the unfair benefit disappear, but 
just that it adds a burden which then equalizes the distribution.  The reader may think of punishment as removing the 
unfairness resulting from the lawbreaking. 
32 See R.A. Duff's “Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punishment,” pages 26-27, for a 
review of those authors who agree with Hampton. 
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crimes like murder and rape.  Hampton points out that Morris's system assumes that crime is 
something we all wish we could do.  To characterize law abiding citizens as assuming a burden 
of self-restraint is to say that they want to commit the crime.  In order for my following the laws 
against violent crime to be burdensome, I must first be motivated to break that law.  Rational 
citizens are not so motivated.  In the farmland example, I want to drive over your land.  With 
property crimes it is easier to see why not committing the crime may be a burden—an action that 
I want to do but choose not to do.  With violent crime, the act does not tempt the normal citizen 
such that not doing it imposes a cost:  “If I refrain from murdering you, am I really imposing a 
cost on myself for the sake of creating a collectively advantageous social order?” (Murphy and 
Hampton, 116).  Hampton thinks that Argument 1 fails: the murderer does not deserve 
punishment because she threw off a burden of self-restraint.  It is unreasonable to say that 
rational people find it burdensome to avoid murder.  There must be some other way to link 
punishment to the wrongdoing of the criminal (117). 
 I am not so sure, however, that Hampton's critique of Argument 1 is decisive.  I think 
Morris is right to see law breaking as a benefit.  I also think Hampton is right to say that rational 
citizens do not consider restraining themselves from violent crime a burden.  Perhaps we can 
have it both ways and respond to Hampton as follows.  Rex murders my sister, a mentor of mine 
of whom I am very fond.  Rex's crime still creates an unfair burden on me, an additional victim, 
which needs to be counter-balanced through the punishment of Rex.  I suffer an unfair burden, 
although it is not the burden of restraining me from killing my sister (or anyone).  Rather the 
unfair burden is the post-crime burden of living without my sister whom I cherish and living 
under the fear of murderers.  Rex creates a burden which he unfairly forces upon me.  I do not 
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have my sister and am now concerned that others may murder me.  I am also concerned about 
murder in general.  Society appears to me “unfair.” 
 Under this interpretation of Morris’s argument, punishment still, at least partially, 
restores the equilibrium of benefits and burdens without forcing us to admit that avoiding murder 
is a rational burden.  We see punishment not so much as balancing out the additional unfair 
benefit the criminal gains but rather compensating the unfair burden which Rex forces on his 
victims, including me and others who knew my sister or learned of her murder through the media 
or otherwise.  Punishment removes this burden, in part, by restoring our confidence in the system 
of cooperation.  We do not fear murderers (as much) anymore.33 
 It may be objected that this response to Hampton does not stay true to Morris's argument.  
After all, Morris explicitly cites the “unfair advantage” gained by “renouncing what others have 
assumed, the burden of self-restraint” (478).  Thus, to truly respond to Hampton we will have to 
identify what unfair benefit the criminal gains without falling into the trap of saying that 
restraining one's self from murder (and other heinous crimes) is a rational burden. 
  Consider the following.34 In a diverse democratic society, individuals are at liberty to 
pursue their own conception of the good within certain constraints.  In the case of Rex we say 
that part of his conception of the good entails murdering my sister.  However, Rex's full pursuit 
of his good is outlawed by a legal prohibition of murder.  Such a law is consistent with the 
principles free and equal citizens in a democracy would collectively will. 
                                                 
33 The qualification “as much” here shows that this account needs more detail than I have space to address.  In 
particular, it is not clear how this account satisfies the demand for proportionality.  Ideally, punishment would make 
me whole by restoring me to my pre-crime state of not fearing murderers.  In my own experience, however, human 
psychology does not permit such a wholesale restoration.  I will likely still fear murderers even after Rex is punished 
because of the trauma imposed by Rex which may never fully subside.  For example, my experience of being 
mugged produced in me a fear, which I still have, of two or more youths gathering together in urban spaces at night.  
The punishment of the individuals who mugged me would not, it seems to me, eliminate my fear (to my knowledge, 
the punishment of my assailants never came to pass). 
34 Thanks to Professor Christie Hartley for bringing this line of argumentation to my attention.   
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 Like Rex, the rest of us are constrained in some way in the pursuit of our own 
conceptions of the good.  While my own conception of the good may not involve murder, it may 
involve other things which are prohibited.  In continuing with the farmland example, my 
conception of the good includes driving across your farmland when I am late for yoga.  Such an 
act is prohibited because it violates the principles of justice to which I am bound.35  Thus, like 
Rex, I am constrained in my full pursuit of my conception of the good.   
 Most, if not all, individuals are at least partially constrained in their pursuit of their 
conceptions of the good.  Such restraint takes on a variety of forms according to the variety of 
conceptions of the good (whereas I like driving across farmlands, someone else likes petty 
vandalism).  Inasmuch as law abiding citizens restrain themselves from full pursuit of their 
conceptions of the good, they are burdened.  Rex did not restrain himself from an act which 
violates the principles of justice.  Law abiding citizens, on the other hand, do restrain themselves.  
The reason we must punish Rex is not because he did not carry the burden of restraining himself 
from murder in particular, but because unlike the rest of us, Rex did not restrain himself from 
that pursuit of his conception of the good which is in violation of the principles of justice. 
 Under this interpretation of Morris, punishment still restores the equilibrium of benefits 
and burdens without forcing us to admit that avoiding murder is a rational burden.  The only 
rational burden is avoiding that pursuit of our own conception of the good which violates the 
principle of justice.  Additionally, we stay true to Morris's theory by identifying the additional 
benefit gained by the criminal.   Punishment eliminates the unfair benefit of Rex's unadulterated 
pursuit of his conception of the good.  We must punish Rex because the rest of us still restrain 
                                                 
35 I cannot comment here on how or why I am so bound, although Morris seems to suggest the Rawlsian view.  
Because one reason we must punish according to Morris is to insure fairness, those who follow the law seem to be 
upholding fairness.  Fairness thus seems to demand that I sometimes stop short of fully pursuing my conception of 
the good. 
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ourselves from certain actions which fall within the purview of our conception of the good, even 
though the prohibited actions we would like to do are not identical to Rex’s prohibited actions.36   
 I suppose there are objections to this response.  We could say, for example, that not all 
violations of the principles of justice are equal.  In other words, the response on behalf of Morris 
assumes that everyone finds it equally difficult to restrain themselves from full pursuit of their 
conceptions of the good—Rex finds it as difficult to restrain from murder as I do from driving 
over your farmland.  This seems questionable.  Still, I suspect that there might be other ways to 
respond to Hampton's claim.  We could, for example, adopt George Sher's approach and say that 
the unfair benefit is the additional freedom obtained (Sher, 82).  Yet, there are objection's to 
Sher's approach as well (Dolinko, 546-548).  Thus it might be instructive to put aside Argument 
1 for the time being and see if there are any problems with Argument 2, especially in light of the 
fact that many find Morris's account compelling.  For if Argument 2 fails, any arguments that 
criminals obtain an unfair advantage become irrelevant no matter how decisive.  Alternatively, if 
Argument 2 has a non-obvious implication (such as requiring rehabilitation) then those who find 
Morris's account compelling will still have something to think about (but some previous fans of 
Morris might begin to question Morris's account on the basis of this implication). 
 
 
                                                 
36 This account, while plausibly Morrisian, may still be objectionable to Morris.  Morris focuses on the unfair benefit 
gained by the criminal and appeals to the notion that this benefit should be counter balanced by adding the obvious 
burden of pain and suffering attendant on punishment.  Any burdens incurred by the criminal's victim or society are 
largely ignored.  I think, however, that we need some kind of solution to the lack of attention Morris pays to victims 
and I think we can stay within the Morrisian account to do so (my rehabilitation system also has this advantage).  
The lack of concern for the victim is part of the reason Hershenov embraces the idea that victims' satisfaction of 
revenge helps justify punishment.   He says that Morris “fails to locate the main creditors or the proper currency for 
the payment” (Hershenov, 80).  In other words, Morris tells us who deserves to pay for the crime (the criminal, 
obviously) but does not tell us who gets restored by the criminal's payment.  So I think Hershenov is right about his 
critique but wrong about his suggestion.  It seems that the victim needs some restoration and if punishment does that 
through the satisfaction of revenge or through the account I outlined above then we still justify punishment as 
restoring fair distribution of benefits and burdens. 
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Chapter Five: Why Morris's Argument Requires Rehabilitation 
 I believe that Morris's theory requires us to set up an institution of rehabilitation because 
legal punishment fails to uphold the social order.  If I am right, then this is a critique of Morris in 
that he failed to address something that he should have addressed.   
 Before we begin, I need to clear up a potential confusion around the meaning of 
“rehabilitation.”  The standard usage of “rehabilitation” is to “refer to cases in which the 
offender, after serving a sentence, no longer commits crimes because he believes that criminal 
behavior is wrong and not because he fears punishment” (Ten, 7, note 1).  So authors generally 
distinguish rehabilitation from special deterrence on the basis of the motivating reasons for the 
criminals’ subsequent law abiding behavior.  Rehabilitated criminals stop their crimes because 
they think breaking the law is wrong.  Deterred criminals stop because they want to avoid more 
punishment.  But both stop committing crimes, so they are both “deterred” in a broader sense.   
 On this standard usage, we could use “rehabilitation to theoretically refer to any method 
which gets the criminal to stop for moral reasons.  So traditional modes of pain and suffering 
associated with punishment—even cruel and unusual punishment—could be called rehabilitation 
if they convince the criminal to stop breaking the law because she thinks breaking the law is 
immoral.  This is not the usage of rehabilitation that I intend for this thesis.  I use “rehabilitation” 
to refer to softer responses to wrongdoing, responses that are not straightforwardly painful in the 
sense that punishment is straightforwardly painful.37  Whereas the traditional literature uses 
“rehabilitation” to distinguish the reasons criminals stop committing crime, I use “rehabilitation” 
to mark off a different kind of response to wrongdoing.   
                                                 
37  My rehabilitation may still be painful in a sense.  As I say below I have in mind a kind of moral education where 
we enter into a dialogue with the criminals and try to expose any false belief systems that may be underlying their 
criminal behavior.  There may be some pain associated with the dissolution of long-held, false beliefs.  But this is 
not the same kind of pain associated with the traditional forms of punishment: incarceration, execution, and fines.   
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 So when I say that Morris's account requires us to set up an institution of rehabilitation I 
am not saying that we have to do whatever it takes to get the criminal to stop for moral reasons.  
Rather, I am saying that, since punishment does not do the job that Morris's theory needs it to do, 
we must setup a different kind of institution.  A softer, rehabilitative institution seems an obvious 
choice.  I will flesh out the details as my argument requires.  Briefly, I envision a place of moral 
transformation or moral education.  It is not therapy, where we assume the criminal is sick and 
force him to change.  Rather, it is akin to interpersonal debate where the criminal is given the 
space (in a controlled environment) to share his views about why he chose to commit the crime.  
His views would then be contrasted with the point of view which believes that following the law 
(especially as it relates to violent crime) is right or proper.  The hope is that the criminal would 
come to see the error of his false beliefs and choose to follow the law voluntarily in the future.  
His beliefs would thus be rehabilitated or transformed to reflect the truth—he would become a 
better moral agent.  
 Recall that part of the reason we must restore the benefits and burdens through 
punishment, according to Morris, is that it restores law abiding citizens' confidence, or trust, in 
the system of non-interference.38  As I will show shortly, the consensus of empirical data 
suggests that a punishment system fails to restore this trust.  Furthermore, our current system is 
not designed to facilitate that goal.  Since we are still required to restore this trust (without 
completely abandoning a Morrisian account) we must explore other options and rehabilitation 
seems a good candidate.   
 While empirical data on the effectiveness of punishment is messy in many areas, there 
seems to be one area of consensus: criminals do not stop committing crime as a result of 
punishment of any type that we have employed in the modern era (except capital punishment).  
                                                 
38 See Chapter 2 pages 15-16 above. 
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Empirical research suggests this as an uncontroversial assumption.39  Recidivism rates are 
unequivocally high.  In note 14 above I cited C.L. Ten who discussed a report by the National 
Academy of Sciences which concluded that the evidence suggests that individuals are not 
deterred by punishment.  Punishment does not appear to stop the individual from repeating his 
behavior (although it might deter the general population).  In one of the papers commissioned by 
that report, Daniel Nagin says that 
On balance, recent evidence tends to suggest that special deterrence, which 
observationally is difficult to distinguish from other forms of 'rehabilitation,' is 
not operating.  This tentative conclusion is suggested by the apparent invariance 
of recidivism to any type of special rehabilitative program.  The figures suggest 
that recidivism rates cannot be affected by varying the severity of punishment, at 
least within acceptable limits (Nagin, 95-96).   
 
Here Nagin uses “rehabilitation” in the standard usage—to simply refer to criminals who 
stop committing crime as a result of their incarceration, whether for moral reasons or out 
of fear.  The “special rehabilitative programs” which he mentions are correctional 
treatment strategies, not the kind of moral education response that I have in mind.  In 
short, recidivism rates are high.  Criminals do not stop committing crime as a result of 
being punished.   
 Punishment does not restore the law abiding citizens' confidence in the system of self-
restraint.  Punishment does not (as it is supposed to according to Morris) work to support law 
abiding citizens' “disposition to comply voluntarily”; rather, citizens’ disposition to comply 
                                                 
39 One could respond by saying that while real world punishment schemes have failed to stop criminals, the 
empirical research does not address a hypothetically improved punishment scheme.  Thus punishment without 
rehabilitation might get criminals to stop committing crime and thus fulfill the demands of Morris's social order 
premise.  Here is my response: punishment-only schemes have been tried in a variety of forms, from grotesque 
(quartering) to anesthetic (lethal injection), for a much longer period of time than rehabilitative schemes.  
Admittedly it is always open for us to explore more effective forms of punishment.  However, in light of the fact that 
many variations of one family of state responses (punishment) have been tried in the real world in a variety of ways 
over the course of centuries to little or no avail, it would seem at least prudent to investigate more fully another 
family of state responses, rehabilitation.  The rehabilitative responses do not have quite as miserable a track record 
since we have only begun using them in minor forms during the last half of the twentieth century. 
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“diminishes” because “others are with impunity renouncing burdens they are assuming” (477).  
In other words, citizens begin to lose confidence in the mutually advantageous system because 
punishment does not ensure that criminals will, in the future, use self-restraint.  Punishment does 
not keep individuals from renouncing their burdens.  Thus punishment fails to maintain the 
social order by failing to provide “some assurance” that we “will not be assuming burdens which 
others are unprepared to assume” (477). 
 Part of maintaining the system of non-interference means helping to ensure that criminals 
stop violating the system of self restraint.  It is reasonable to think that law abiding citizens want 
to ensure as best they can that criminals do not violate the system.  A “punishment only” system 
conflicts with Morris's account because it does not respect the rights of law abiding citizens who 
are entitled to some assurance that criminals stop violating the system of self restraint, as 
opposed to the mere assurance that the benefit of non-restraint will continually be counter-
balanced by the burden of deprivations.  In short, we cannot simply respond to the criminal act 
by depriving the criminal, unless that deprivation helps insure that the criminal stops committing 
crime.  Our response to criminal wrongdoing, if it is to maintain the system of non-interference, 
must do more than merely keep “matters even” (478).  
 Because punishment fails to meet the duty to restore confidence in the system, we have a 
duty to explore other kinds of state responses that differ significantly from the way we have been 
responding to criminal behavior.  In other words, we must explore other options that appear to us 
to have a better chance of stopping criminal behavior.  Rehabilitation seems a good candidate.  
 I am unclear whether rehabilitation is required in addition to, or instead of, punishment.  I 
am open to mixed model here where rehabilitation works in concert with punishment according 
to the two reasons that Morris offers to punish.  The first reason—the duty to maintain social 
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order—turns out not to be a reason to punish but instead requires us to setup rehabilitation.  The 
second reason—the duty to restore the equilibrium of benefits and burdens—may still require us 
to punish.  Punishment-only may make sense for some offenders where the punishment will 
ensure that they cannot offend again, where keeping matters even does in fact work to protect the 
social order as Morris thought was the case for all crimes.  For example, revoking a doctor's 
license for bad practice may be sufficient to ensure he does not repeat.  For other criminals, 
rehabilitation-only make sense, as may be the case for young offenders.  For still other offenses, 
such as violent crimes that do not call for total incapacitation (i.e., life in prison or execution), a 
combination of punishment and rehabilitation may be required.  In cases of negligent homicide, 
for example, we may believe strongly in burdening the individual with punishment.  Also, 
however, we will want to insure that this kind of thing does not happen again upon release and 
will need to educate the criminal about his false moral beliefs.  The negligent killer will need to 
see that he inappropriately values, say, wealth, at the expense of harming innocent people. 
 Rehabilitation, as I conceive of it, is permitted by Morris because it maintains respect for 
criminals as demanded by the Kantian framework.  Rehabilitation thought of as moral education 
is permitted by the Kantian framework because we are allowed to try to convince those who 
break the law that their behavior is contrary to society's rules and likely immoral.  Nothing in 
Morris's theory seems to deny the permissibility of a state institution of rehabilitation, as long as 
that institution does not take to treating criminals as patients, rather than agents.  As we saw, 
Morris is committed to respecting the role of reason and must allow criminals and others to 
express their beliefs about criminal behavior and law.  This commitment seems to extend to us 
the moral permissibility of setting up an institution of rehabilitation.   
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 We take it for granted that there are ways of attempting to convince people of the 
immorality of their behavior, and implore them to change, without treating them as animals to be 
conditioned or as sick individuals needing to be cured.  Indeed, higher education is founded upon 
the belief that we can and should try to disabuse each other of false beliefs.  There should be no 
special prohibitions against arguing about moral beliefs, including the criminal's generally false 
moral belief that breaking the law is justified in some way.  Thus Morris must be thought to 
consider it morally required to establish an institution dedicated to helping criminals see the 
moral error of their ways.40 
 If rehabilitation is to be conducted like interpersonal dialogue with attendant parameters 
ensuring respect, there is a question about whether eligible criminals would participate.  They 
may simply refuse to talk.  Alternatively, they may be convinced that their behavior is unjustified 
but refuse to change because they see no reason to be moral.  They may be amoral.  If the 
criminal refuses to talk, deontological constraints block us from using certain modes of force (we 
cannot torture them or give them a truth serum).  If they are amoral the situation seems even 
worse—no amount of convincing will work to change their behavior. 
 I can assuage the worry that criminals will not talk, but I may not be able to eliminate it.  
We should keep in mind that rehabilitation as I conceive of it is inherently respectful.  It is 
                                                 
40 We might be tempted to change the definition of punishment so as to require the state to tell the criminal that he is 
punished out of respect for his choices.  I would prefer this revision, but such a move, I am afraid, would be 
vulnerable to the “definitional stop” objection outlined by H. L. A. Hart.  Hart cautions us against loading our 
definition of punishment with, for example, prohibitions on punishing the innocent.  Prohibiting the punishment of 
innocents taps a strong intuition and so appears to be an innocent addendum.  Who would object to defining 
punishment as an act limited to those who are guilty?  But as Hart shows us, to do so is to beg the question against 
consequentialist justifications to whom it is a theoretically open question as to whether we should punish the 
innocent.  “[The definitional stop] would prevent us from investigating the very thing which modern skepticism 
[about the justification of punishment] most calls in question: namely the rational and moral status of our preference 
for a system of punishment under which measures painful to individuals are to be taken against them only when they 
have committed an offence” (Hart, 6).  Requiring the criminal to understand that punishment respects his choices 
would beg the question in favor of my thesis since imparting that knowledge would require some measure of 
education (and abstract knowledge of it is not enough).  I do think that we have to impart this knowledge, but not 
because the definition should include such a requirement.  Rather, I think we must impart this knowledge for the 
reasons outlined above. 
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inviting, in a way.  Some wrongdoers may never have even had an experience of being respected 
by being asked to share their views.  There is a certain incentive to participate in rehabilitation.  
This suggests that there will be more willingness to participate than we might initially think.  I 
admit, however, that this would be a problem, especially in light of long-standing suspicion of 
the criminal justice system in general. 
 The other thing to keep in mind, though, is that we are still limiting the criminal's liberty 
through rehabilitation.  In this way, we are still accounting for the unfair benefit the criminal 
received by throwing off his burden of self-restraint.41  The difference is that we are just 
choosing to do things differently during the time in which the criminal's liberty is restricted.  
Instead of punishing him and throwing off our duty to uphold law abiding citizens' confidence, 
we instead engage in rehabilitation.   
 My response to the question of amorality is stronger.  If a criminal believes that he has no 
reason to be moral, then he is denying that morality can make a claim on him.  He may be 
completely unable to understand how he could be under the dictates of morality.  In this case we 
have a sociopath on our hands and rehabilitation probably does not make sense.42  This person 
appears to have lost his status as a moral agent.  Our deontological constraint based on respect 
for persons would be lifted.  On a practical level, however, we should be careful with leveling 
this charge in light of our limited capacities to mark out such a class.  Antisocial behavior, even 
grossly antisocial behavior like serial killings, does not obviously merit inclusion of the 
                                                 
41 Thanks to Professor William A. Edmundson for pointing this out to me. 
42  See Jean Hampton's account of immorality in “Mens Rea,” where she says that defiance of moral authority is the 
ground upon which we declare an action culpable.  To be in defiance, however, one must know that authority makes 
a claim on her.  But, “someone who cannot understand the authority of morality cannot be expected to conform her 
actions in accord with it when the moral dictates oppose her desires” (Hampton, “Mens Rea,” 94).  These are people 
that completely lack consciences.  I do not like allowing for this theoretical possibility, but I admit I have no 
argumentative resources at this point.  I am more inclined to deny that anyone could ever be completely amoral.  But 
I cannot defend this point here. 
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individual in the class of amoral people (since behavior is a notoriously difficult indicator of 
mental states). 
 If, on the other hand, the criminal understands that morality is authoritative over him—
that morality forbids his criminal act—but just refuses to obey the authority of morality, then I 
think this person is in a position of self-hatred and rehabilitation is the appropriate response.  
How can a non-sociopath come to believe that he has little or no reason to obey morality?  One 
obvious answer is when the person sees himself as inherently evil.  Hampton gives us reason to 
believe that when one begins to worry that he is inherently evil one is, to that extent, engaged in 
self-hatred: “If the wrongdoer fears that the victim is right to see him as cloaked in evil, or as 
infected with moral rot, these fears can engender moral hatred of himself” (Murphy and 
Hampton, 86).  The correct response to a self-hater is not more punishment which will reinforce 
the worrisome message that the criminal is inherently evil, but just the kind of rehabilitative 
approach I have outlined.  Getting the person to stop hating himself may be the crucial element 
in getting him to stop committing crime.   
 Besides the problems of participation stemming both from refusal to talk and refusal to 
understand or obey morality’s authority, we may object to rehabilitation on other grounds.  
Because rehabilitation or education is often confused with therapy one might read Morris as 
prohibiting rehabilitation on the grounds that it disrespects wrongdoers.  Morris cautions us 
against any therapeutic “tendencies of thought” (482).  So we might read him as saying that any 
system which tries to engage in the business of changing the criminal (even if done in an 
acceptably respectful environment) sets the stage for treating criminals as patients rather than 
agents.   
Therapy and punishment differ widely in their implications.  In bringing out some 
of these differences I want again to draw attention to the important fact that while 
34 
the distinctions [between voluntary and non-voluntary actions] we now draw are 
erased in the therapy world, they may, in fact, be reintroduced but under different 
descriptions.  To the extent they are, we really have a punishment system 
combined with a therapy system (482).   
 
Perhaps the term “rehabilitation” is just the type of “different description” of therapy of which 
Morris is afraid.  The idea is that if we try to convince the criminal of the immorality of her 
behavior we may come to see her behavior as a symptom of some disease and thus disrespect her 
by failing to look upon her as a rational chooser.  Rehabilitation cannot do this within the 
Kantian framework.   
 At best this objection merely reminds us to be careful in how we define and implement 
rehabilitation.  But there is nothing in moral education—trying to convince criminals of the 
immorality of their behavior through reasoned discussion—that should raise the red flag of 
therapy.   
 Another objection to the claim that rehabilitation is permissible under Morris's 
framework might say that rehabilitation gives an unfair, additional benefit to the criminal.  The 
state's response is supposed to burden the criminal in order to balance things out.  If 
rehabilitation makes the criminal better, then it seems we are giving a real benefit to the criminal 
that he does not deserve.  We need to think about what justifies the extra state expenditure on 
criminals for moral education.   
 We need to distinguish, however, between broader social benefits (such as subsidized 
healthcare, education, and social security) and the benefit of breaking the law which requires a 
retributive response.43  Wrongdoers who undergo rehabilitation are not incurring any additional 
benefit of not complying with the system of self-restraint.  They have not gained another unfair 
benefit in the relevant sense.   
                                                 
43 Thanks to Professor Christie Hartley for this line of thought. 
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 The benefit that is in play here is the restoration of law abiding citizens’ confidence—a 
consideration about which Morris cares deeply.  If it works to convince the criminal of his 
erroneous beliefs, then rehabilitation restores our confidence that criminals will be law abiding, 
in a way that punishment does not.  We are interested in rehabilitating the criminal because it 
ensures social order.  Furthermore, the victim herself is at least partially restored along the lines I 
suggested in Chapter Four.  The victim is relieved of her fear.  This relief is more permanent in 
the case of rehabilitation than traditional punishment.  Limited state resources mean that violent 
criminals who are not executed are often released from prison.  This is a fantastic let down for 
victims, especially in the case of violent crime.  If the criminal is rehabilitated, however, the 
victim is given greater assurance that her assailant will not repeat his behavior.  She is not merely 
given a reprieve during the time of the criminal's incarceration.   
 Let me summarize.  We justify punishment according to Morris because it ensures equal 
distribution of benefits and burdens throughout society.  The state has a duty to ensure this kind 
of equality in order to protect the social order.  Part of protecting the social order is ensuring that 
criminals stop committing crime.  Punishment fails in this regard.  Thus we have a duty to 
endorse suitable alternatives like rehabilitation.   
 
Chapter Six: Responding to Objections 
 While I have tried to clear away initial objections in Chapter Five by showing that there 
is nothing in Morris's theory which prohibits us from endorsing rehabilitation, two crucial 
objections to my argument remain.  The first claims that rehabilitation, like punishment, fails to 
uphold the social order.  The second position revises Morris's account, claiming that we can 
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jettison the appeal to social order and justify punishment solely on the grounds that we have a 
duty to keep the scales balanced.     
Objection #1: Rehabilitation Does Not Work 
 The central objection to my position points out that empirical research suggests 
uncontroversially that rehabilitation and punishment alike both fail to keep criminals from 
violating the system of non-restraint.  While there is some research which suggests that the 
quasi-rehabilitative methods employed in our criminal justice system may, in fact, work, I will 
proceed during this objection on the assumption that research suggests unequivocally that the 
rehabilitative methods we have so far employed fail.44  If I can rebut this objection it has the 
effect of making my argument stronger by forcing me to overcome a greater hurdle than is, 
perhaps, the case.  
 The motivation for this objection stems from the same report cited in Chapter Five.  It 
appears to make rehabilitation a non-starter.  Such research, if truly uncontroversial, suggests 
that I am wrong to morally require rehabilitation since it, like punishment, cannot do the job.  
While Morris's system of just punishment may fail to meet the social order demands of his 
theory, my rehabilitation suggestion seems to fail just as clearly: 
The available research on the impact of various treatment strategies both in and 
out of prison seems to indicate that, after controlling for initial selection 
differences, there are generally no statistically significant differences between the 
subsequent recidivism of offenders, regardless of the form of 'treatment'.  This 
suggests that neither rehabilitative nor criminogenic effects operate very strongly 
(Blumstein et. al., 66).45   
 
                                                 
44 See Robert Martinson’s “New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentencing Reform,” 7 
Hofstra Law Review 243 (1979) and Michael Vitiello’s “Reconsidering Rehabilitation,” 65 Tulane Law Review 1011 
(1991). 
45 The panel here uses “rehabilitative” in the standard usage outlined above.  In the previous paragraph they say “the 
net long-term benefits from incapacitation might also be affected by any possible rehabilitative or 'criminogenic' 
effects of prison [emphasis added]” (66).  So the panel uses the word ambiguously among punitive and non-punitive 
measures.  However, the “treatment” mentioned here by the panel does seem to include non-punitive methods.  This 
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“Criminogenic effects” result when going to prison actually makes the criminal commit more 
crime upon her release, presumably because she learned more “tricks of the trade” while 
surrounded by other inmates.  The relevant point of the quotation is that most scholars agree that 
state responses of various types do not stop criminals from committing crime.  If this skepticism 
is inclusive of rehabilitation, then I cannot require rehabilitation on the grounds that it might, 
unlike punishment, eliminate recidivism.  Because responses to wrong-doing “both in and out of 
prison” showed “no statistically significant differences between the subsequent recidivism of 
wrongdoers regardless of the form of 'treatment'” we seem entitled to conclude that rehabilitation 
likewise fails.  Neither punitive (in prison) nor non-punitive (out of prison) responses work to 
stop criminal behavior.  In short, it appears that no kind of response to wrongdoing reviewed by 
the panel seems sufficient to meet the demand laid out by Morris.  No attempts to change or 
convince the criminal that her behavior is wrong (either punitively or non-punitively), and thus 
restore the system of non-interference, serve us any better than regular punishment.  There seems 
to be no sense in wasting time investigating the moral requirement to setup an institution of 
rehabilitation of the type I am suggesting.   
 First, this quotation may not be as inclusive as this objection suggests.  The authors may 
put the word “treatment” in quotation marks in order to distinguish it from the kind of 
rehabilitative response that I am suggesting.  The studies that are referenced by this quotation 
have titles which investigate the “effectiveness of correctional treatment” and “correctional 
programs.”  Moreover, out-of-prison responses may be equally as punitive as in-prison 
responses.  For example, a criminal could be doing forced labor.   
                                                                                                                                                             
suggests that even rehabilitation (as I conceive of it) will not do the job that Morris requires.  This constitutes the 
central objection discussed here.  
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 I do not have time, however, to review the actual studies to see if “treatment” and 
“correctional” activities include rehabilitation of the type I am suggesting.  Thus I am prepared to 
admit that they may include some quasi-rehabilitative efforts mainly because our actual justice 
system has incorporated some rehabilitative aspects from time to time.  For example, some 
prisons employ pet therapy programs, where prisoners who demonstrate good behavior are 
allowed to enjoy the responsibility of caring for pets.  Such programs may help criminals become 
better moral agents insofar as they increase their capacity to empathize.  In short, I am not 
prepared to dismiss this empirical evidence from the panel (while holding on to other empirical 
evidence) on the ground that, despite appearances, it only covers purely deprivation-based 
models.   
 To respond to the objection I must, at this point, further distinguish the program which I 
think Morris's argument requires.  It must be sufficiently different from any previous state 
responses to wrong-doing so that I can claim that the scope of the empirical studies clearly fails 
to include rehabilitation as I conceive it. 
 To get a better idea of my suggestion, consider the story of David.46  Several weeks 
before David's release from a long prison term, Sarah visits our center.  As David's advocate, 
Sarah investigates resources in preparation for David's transition from prison knowing that many 
ex-offenders move straight from jail to homelessness.  A child of incest, David began a radical 
twelve step program in prison.  Criminals and Gangbangers Anonymous thinks of crime as, in 
some cases, an addiction over which some have no control.47  David comes to me a happy, 
                                                 
46 In 2005 and 2006 I worked at a drop-in center for homeless men.  This is an actual story but I changed names to 
preserve anonymity. 
47 This part of David's history is related only to highlight that David was trying to make himself a better person.  
Some may suppose though that if David were truly addicted to crime then he appears to lose his autonomy as a 
moral agent, freeing even Kantians to condition him as they please.  But for Kantians, to lose his capacity for 
rational agency, he would have to altogether lose that capacity.  Addiction does not strip an individual of that 
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healthy, funny, and gentle human being.  I have no idea what crime(s) he committed.  All at 
once, David needs to secure permanent housing, employment, identification, transportation, 
clothing, and more.  David's halfway house is in a crime-infested part of town.  The demands of 
living independently in our society—difficult enough for those of us with privilege—begin to 
wear on David.  A few weeks after his release David smokes marijuana, fails his mandatory drug 
test and violates his parole.  David goes back to prison.   
 David's story draws us to the kind of softer, rehabilitative response to wrongdoing that I 
think Morris's argument requires in order to safeguard citizens' confidence.  More punitive 
measures in David's case are clearly not the answer.  David needs the kind of moral education 
combined with post-release subsidies of the kind that Sarah tried to secure, all on an institutional 
level.48 
 David needs to be confronted about his mistaken moral judgments.  He needs to 
investigate the rationale behind his decision to smoke marijuana and his rationale behind his 
                                                                                                                                                             
capacity.  Furthermore the twelve step program of recovery is designed to relieve David of the obsession to commit 
crime.  In other words, the program restores him to full autonomy, even with respect to criminal activities.   
48 It is because of stories like David's that I began to become suspicious of punishment in general.  The “David 
Problem,” however, is not the purview of traditional philosophy.  At the most, the David Problem is one deep in 
applied ethics.  We could include among the class of David Problems all of those injustices of our current penal 
system that do not reflect problematically on whatever theory of punishment a philosopher may endorse.  Putting 
innocent people on death row, for example, is a problem of our imperfect system, but not necessarily a problem for 
the moral justification of the death penalty.  Philosophers are more interested in whether punishment—given a 
certain definition and under ideal applicative circumstances—can be justified.  We entertain the ideal case because, 
if the justification fails in the ideal, it fails in the real.  We may reach a consensus, as philosophers, that the death 
penalty is morally acceptable but refuse, as a society, to implement the death penalty given the system's 
imperfections.     
     The purpose of David's story is thus not to highlight the problems of implementing the institution but to paint for 
the reader in general outline a response to wrongdoing that we have inadequately explored—a softer, rehabilitative 
response I believe to be morally required.   
     That said, I also want to note that I think David Problems are too easily brushed aside.  A “feasible” defense of 
punishment may turn out not to be “morally accessible.”  According to Allen Buchanan, a feasible system is one that 
is “compatible with human psychology, human capacities generally, the laws of nature, and the natural resources 
available to human beings.” A merely “accessible” system is one that is feasible but also has “a practical route from 
where we are now to at least a reasonable approximation of the state of affairs that satisfies its principles.”  Finally a 
“morally accessible” system is one that “should be achievable without unacceptable moral costs.”  See Allen 
Buchanan’s Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination (NY: Oxford University Press, 2004, 61).  It is important to 
note when an argument that is feasible turns out not to be morally accessible because we do not want to go around 
endorsing systems that can only be implemented at “unacceptable moral costs.”  Thanks to Professor A. J. Cohen for 
pointing out the distinctions here. 
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original crime(s).  This will require inquiry with someone else who challenges his beliefs.  I 
believe part of this process will also be opening David's mind to the possibilities of a flourishing 
life.  He may be ignorant of what life can be like out of prison and outside of the drug-infested 
part of town.  Part of his moral education may involve, for example, bearing witness to the 
qualities of a virtuous life.  As part of our mission in Oakland we took the men to high-end 
theater, museums, and national parks.  We may even establish programs where David goes to 
live with, or at least visit, functional citizens.  It will be best if he can witness functional citizenry 
among formerly incarcerated individuals.   
 The process of moral education will involve restoring David to a positive belief about his 
own dignity.  Remember, we punished him in the first place because we respect and thus belief 
in his equal worth as a person.  David likely does not understand this—neither that we punish 
him out of respect nor, more fundamentally, that he actually does have worth equal to that of the 
wealthiest, or most powerful, or most famous, or most righteous members of our society.  The 
importance of restoring dignity should not be underestimated in the cases where criminals 
internalize the message (perhaps reinforced by prison sentences) that they are inherently evil.  
Nothing insures so much that a criminal will continue to do evil as the belief that he is inherently 
evil.   
 Part of restoring dignity is showing trust in David as a responsible person.  For example, 
at our daytime facility for homeless men we employed on-the-street men as managers of our 
community, entrusting them—some former hard-core criminals—with keys to our facility and 
access to our alarm code.  We believed in nurturing dignity even if that meant taking risks with 
our property.  Of course, the risk was a calculated one.  For example, while the managers had 
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access to the small “cash register” which held the coffee money, they did not have access to the 
safe.   
 People like David cannot engage in this kind of internal transformation without some 
significant resources which alleviate the stress of re-entering life as a productive citizen.  David 
will need some space to think, uncluttered by the demands of mere survival.  We could invoke 
Aristotelian arguments that some moderate amount of resources is necessary for a virtuous life 
(or at least a life that does not involve the violation of the law).  “It seems clear that happiness 
needs the addition of external goods...for it is difficult if not impossible to do fine deeds without 
any resources” (Aristotle, 1099a30).  Recall that we are concerned with morally educating the 
criminal and that for Aristotle, happiness consists in “an activity of the soul in accordance with 
virtue” (1098a15).  Aristotle's position in ethics further supports our endorsement of moral 
education since he believed that “moral virtues, like crafts, are acquired by practice and 
habituation” (1103a11).  David will need resources in order to support his change in habit.49 
 Substantive access to two crucial resources comes to mind: housing and transportation.  
First he needs housing outside the drug-infested part of town.  Since David has neither income 
upon release nor any immediate way to generate that income, he will likely need subsidized 
housing.  Perhaps the housing could be part of a work-release program where, on site, David 
could work and live, generating an income and gaining experience.  Encouraging accountability 
is an important part of moral education so he should pay some portion of his rent, but it will have 
to be accountability in the context of the extreme stress under which these people live.  
Behaviors do not change overnight.  For example, my supervisor in Oakland ran an organization 
where he offered housing at a rate determined not by market forces, but by what a man could 
                                                 
49 To develop this fully, I also need to argue against other parts of Aristotle's theory, especially where he claims that 
people cannot be morally educated after the mid-twenties.  In general I am attracted to a eudaemonistic conception 
of justice and would like to explore what kind of state response is justified under this view.   
42 
typically earn as a day laborer in the area.  Residents who failed to pay on a given week were not 
immediately evicted but instead joined the Saturday morning cleanup crew.   
 Because secure long-term employment is particularly hard to get for the formerly 
incarcerated (for obvious reasons), the subsidized housing will also have to be long-term (at least 
one year).50  The housing will also have to be away from the crime-ridden part of town, i.e. our 
current halfway house system will not do.  This serves to reduce temptation (an admittedly thin 
reason since he could seek things out on his own) but also to restore dignity.   
 Secondly, David needs secure transportation.  David needs secure transportation so that 
he can search for a long-term job and, in his case, attend twelve step meetings.  Housing and 
transportation are the two crucial background resources that will allow David to engage in moral 
transformation because these resources allow for eventual functionality after the subsidized 
release program terminates.   
 This general outline is the rehabilitative program which I think has not been shown 
ineffective empirically and is the kind of thing that might get criminals to stop their criminal 
behavior.  Since Morris's argument requires us to set up a system which gets criminals to stop 
breaking the law in order to protect the social order, we need to look into these kinds of 
suggestions if we are to remain plausibly Morrisian.   
Objection #2: Deny that Morris Needs to Restore the Social Order 
 Another solution to the supposed uncontroversial skepticism about the effectiveness of 
punishment is to deny that Morris needs to insure that criminals stop breaking the law.  We 
                                                 
50 Perhaps the reasons are not so obvious to my readers.  Employers run background checks and routinely refuse 
candidates on the basis of criminal misdemeanors, especially if the job is for an entry-level position such as 
telemarketing jobs.  Getting these misdemeanor charges dropped was the main benefit received by participants in the 
Homeless Court program.  For felons it may be impossible to get secure employment within a year.  There was no 
program to drop felony charges.  Even so-called “expungement” programs did not stop employers from seeing that a 
felony was expunged.   I saw three main options for felons in the Oakland area: some unions (mainly the 
Longshoremen), day labor, and sole proprietorship.  Sole proprietorship is closed to most (but not all) felons due to 
lack of skills leaving only the union which had a monstrous waiting list and day labor which was not secure.  
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would be left then with only the duty to balance the benefits and burdens.  Since the restoration 
of equal distribution seems to be the fundamental reason that criminals deserve punishment, 
simply rejecting the social order premise seems like a good idea.  This approach has the 
advantage of avoiding the potentially messy empirical data surrounding any new rehabilitative 
suggestions: we have no need to ensure that criminals stop committing crime because Morris 
does not seem to rely too heavily on the idea that we should restore citizens’ confidence in the 
system of non-interference.  Rather, we have done enough to simply counter-balance the unfair 
benefit by taking away the criminal's time and/or money. 
 I argue, however, that Morris's appeal to the social order is more important than it 
initially appears.  The appeal to the social order gives us a powerful explanation of the 
motivation behind law abiding citizenry.  Restoring the moral order is inexorably linked to 
Morris's conception of society as a mutually advantageous system of self-restraint. 
 We can characterize law abiding citizenry in two general ways.  (1) Citizens follow the 
law because they understand that restraining themselves in this way is necessary to enjoy the 
benefits of a mutually advantageous society.  (2) Citizens follow the law because they do not 
want to be punished.  These represent the extremes of a continuum—citizens are often motivated 
by both and in different degrees.  However, to completely jettison the social order premise we 
would have to embrace (2).  This will not work for Morris because (1) is a perfectly plausible 
explanation of law abiding behavior for some citizens.  Furthermore, it seems implausible to 
suggest that citizens are only motivated under (2).  Thus we should recognize that (1) is an 
integral part of the account of law abiding behavior, that to embrace (2) is to leave out a 
substantial class of individuals for which we need to account.    
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 Many criminals, then, are individuals who fail to recognize that breaking the law 
undermines the social order.  They fail to see that breaking the law is bad for everybody, 
including themselves.  Thus they need to be rehabilitated—they need to be educated about why 
they should follow the law.   
 If we are to remain plausibly Morrisian it seems we must retain the appeal to social order.  
Without it, we endorse an implausibly limited explanatory account of law abiding citizenry.  If 
we reject the duty to maintain social order we thus undermine Morris's conception of society as a 
cooperative system of self-restraint and we fail to justify punishment on the basis of the 
maldistribution of benefits and burdens.  There may, of course, be other ways to justify 
punishment retributively by explicating a criminal’s desert without reference to any issues of 
distributive justice.  Such an account may have no need to restore the social order.  Given, 
however, that Morris’s account gained wide popularity (see note 5 above), we have good reason 
to think that an influential retributivist argument requires us to setup rehabilitation, a surprising 
outcome of a notoriously retaliatory theory. 
 
Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 I have approached the strong retributive justification of punishment—the idea that not 
punishing criminals constitutes an immoral act—with some suspicion throughout this inquiry.  
We saw, though, how retributive justice gains its appeal by grounding punishment in our duty to 
ensure fair distribution of benefits and burdens.  Retribution seems to retain its appeal despite 
Hampton's observation that Morris implausibly suggests that law abiding citizens find abstaining 
from violent crime to be a burden.  So, being unable to endorse Hampton's refutation of 
Morrisian retribution, I have argued instead for the softer side of retribution. 
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 We have just seen why rehabilitation is morally required under a Morrisian retributive 
framework.  We must morally educate criminals, and provide for certain goods after their 
release, in order to safeguard citizens' confidence in the cooperative system of self-restraint.  We 
turn to rehabilitation because punishment does not acceptably restore the social order and we 
cannot ignore the role that maintaining social order has in justifying punishment.  Law abiding 
citizens are entitled to some assurance that criminals stop committing crime.  Since moral 
education has not been ruled out empirically like punishment, we have a duty to endorse this 
alternative state response.  We must confront the unexpected:  retribution requires rehabilitation. 
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